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SYMPOSIUM ESSAY
REGULATING INTIMIDATING SPEECH
ALEXANDER TSESIS*
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided in Virginia v. Black that laws pun-
ishing intentionally intimidating cross burning were constitutional. Professor
Alexander Tsesis argues that the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the
authority to enact necessary and proper laws that, like Virginia's statute in
Black, prohibit intentional public displays of symbols with a "long and per-
nicious history." He first discusses the effects that follow from the intimidat-
ing use of destructive messages. Professor Tsesis refutes the absolutist per-
spective that the First Amendment does not allow hate speech regulation, and he
further argues that political speech has been exploited throughout history.
Lastly, this Essay examines the ways in which the Court has interpreted sec-
tion 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and argues that the Amendment should be
used to permit hate speech regulation.
Hate speech that is intentionally used to intimidate others can drasti-
cally undermine public safety and social welfare. A federal statute could
and should address the potential dangers posed by at least some such
speech. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment' authorizes Congress to
punish the intimidating display of symbols associated with slavery and its
incidents, including the display of burning crosses and similar badges of
servitude.
The Court's decision in Virginia v. Black announced, for the first time,
the constitutionality of laws punishing intentionally intimidating cross
burning.2 The Court determined that Virginia, in making it a felony for
citizens to display a burning cross with the intent to intimidate, did not
violate the First Amendment.' Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
recognized that hate groups often use symbols linked to past destructive
* Visiting Professor, University of Pittsburgh Law School; Visiting Assistant Professor,
Chicago-Kent College of Law (on leave); Visiting Scholar, University of Wisconsin-Law
School. J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1996; M.A., University of Illinois at Chicago,
1992; B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1990. t am grateful to Steven H. Shiffrin and Richard
Delgado for their advice.
I The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation.
U.S. CO ST. amend. XIII.
2 538 U.S. 343, 362-63 (2003).
3 Id.
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events to incite violence and discrimination in the present.' Burning
crosses refer to this country's history of involuntary servitude and mark
vulnerable targets with a badge of supposed subordination.' This Essay
argues that the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to en-
act necessary and proper laws that, like Virginia's statute in Black, pro-
hibit intentional public displays of symbols with "a long and pernicious
history."6
Hate groups adopt intimidating symbols with a historical message
linked to slavery or other subordination and oppression.' They target not
only individuals, but also entire groups of people. Hate speakers clad their
arguments in stereotypes about outgroups, using readily recognizable, but
inaccurate, generalizations. Vituperative stereotypes cause various harms.
They not only trigger collective prejudices but also diminish the objects'
sense of welfare and security, making even mundane tasks, like going to
the store, seem perilous.8 Whether they are opportunistic or spiteful, de-
structive messages9 directly limit victims' personal autonomy because they
force them -to avoid traveling in places where graffitied swastikas, burn-
ing crosses, or gay-bashing slogans bode danger."° When they live in the
4 Id. at 1546.
1 Several authors have followed the same line of reasoning. See, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV.
124, 161 (1992) (suggesting that hate speech regulations are legitimate under the Thir-
teenth Amendment "to cleanse America of the badges and incidents of slavery, such as
burning crosses in the yards of black families in the dead of night"); Daniel W. Homstad,
Note, Of Burning Crosses and Chilled Expression 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 167, 185 (1991)
("In a historical context the burning cross reminds us of a society openly tolerant of slav-
ery.").
6 538 U.S. at 363.
7 See Thomas Kleven, Free Speech and the Struggle for Power, 9 N.YL. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 315, 350 (1992) (discussing the "historical relationship between hate speech and
oppression," and the fact that the burning cross and the Nazi swastika are "widely recog-
nized hate symbols"); Laura Leets, Responses to Internet Hate Sites: Is Speech Too Free in
Cyberspace?, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 287, 292 (2001) (describing Neo-Nazi use of the swas-
tika to refer to Adolf Hitler's Third Reich); Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A
Rhetorical Analysis of American and Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech,
1994 Wis. L. REV. 1425, 1467-68 (recounting how the perpetrators of hate speech use
messages with a historical link to violence against such groups as Jews and women).
8 See Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 706 A.2d 706, 721 (N.J. 1998) (determining that
hate speech "'harms the individual who is the target[;] ... it perpetuates negative stereo-
types [and] promotes discrimination ... by creating an atmosphere of fear, intimidation,
harassment, and discrimination"' (quoting LAURA J. LEDERER & RICHARD DELGADO, THE
PRICE WE PAY 4-5 (1995))); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 452 (stating that discrimina-
tory verbal attacks produce "an instinctive, defensive psychological reaction. Fear, rage, shock,
and flight all interfere with any reasoned response.").
91 use "hate speech" and "destructive messages" synonymously in this Essay. My
meaning, however, is semantically closer to "destructive messages" because I am referring
to intentionally intimidating messages uttered against an identifiable group without regard
for whether they are spoken out of hate, desire for personal gain, or some other motive.
10 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2337 (1989) (citing EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp., 664 F.2d 128 (7th
Cir. 1981); Sambos Rest., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 E2d 686, 703 (6th Cit. 1981)).
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very neighborhoods where the symbolic intimidation is perpetrated, vic-
tims may even be forced to move from their homes to avoid the foreseeable
risk." Once a cross has been burnt on its lawn, after all, a black family is
likely to be leery about approaching its own house. Finally, the spread of
bigotry signals a diminution of egalitarianism because it tends to under-
mine the ability of minorities to live as coequal citizens of a constitu-
tional republic. While the United States is a country that values dialogue,
it is also a nation committed to protecting racial and ethnic equality,
which intentional intimidation aims to upset.' 2
I. THE INTIMIDATING USE OF DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES
Hate groups committed to undermining equal citizenship rely on de-
structive messages to popularize their agenda. 3 In The Nature of Prejudice,
one of the foremost authorities on the psychology of prejudice detailed
the sequence of degenerative events: "Although most barking (antilocu-
tion) does not lead to biting, yet there is never a bite without previous
barking. Fully seventy years of political anti-Semitism of the verbal order
antedated the discriminatory Ntirnberg [sic] Laws passed by the Hitler
regime."' 4 Almost immediately following the passage of these laws, the
Nazis' "violent program of extermination" began.' 5 Allport describes the
typical progression: "antilocution ---) discrimination -- ... violence."' 6 The
more frequently a message is repeated, particularly when reputable and
widely available sources broadcast it, the more valid it appears to the
public.'7
Destructive propaganda does not merely spark hatred against the tar-
geted group. Hate speakers' calls to action, which couple derisive ideas
with criminal solutions, pose a national threat.' Even a fringe group, given
" See, e.g., Matt Scallan, Civil Rights Leader Still At It; McGee to Lead MLK Day March,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 19, 2004, at 1.
2 See United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1968) (determining that crimi-
nal penalties against intimidation and violence are aimed at securing equal access to con-
stitutional rights and privileges (citing 18 U.S.C. § 241)); see also Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist
Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 67-
69, 87 (1994) (explaining that hate speech regulation is part of America's egalitarian legal
commitment that entitles all persons to respect and dignity); Johan D. van der Vyver, Uni-
versality and Relativity of Human Rights: American Relativism, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 43, 60 (1998) (stating that some limits on free expression are necessary where egali-
tarianism and human dignity are basic norms).
131 have developed this point at greater length at ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE
MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 99-
117(2002).
14 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 57 (3d ed. 1979).
15 Id.
'
6 1d
.
17 See GEORGE E. SIMPSON & J. MILTON YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES
305-07 (4th ed. 1972); TEUN A. VAN DIJK, COMMUNICATING RACISM 40, 123 (1989).
'1 See PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE 247 (2000) ("In many countries, hostile responses
to cultural, linguistic, and religious differentiation and fascistic enthusiasms for purity lie
2004]
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enough time to indoctrinate a popular audience with an emotive ideology,
can become popular enough to win national elections. The most extreme
example of this phenomenon was the way in which the National Socialist
Party in Germany used anti-Semitism to develop from a group that was a
laughingstock after the 1923 Munich Beer Hall Putsch 19 to a powerful
political party: in 1928, the National Socialists received 2.6% of the popular
vote; in 1932 they won 37% of the vote; and, in 1933, Adolf Hitler became
the German Chancellor.2 ° The Nazis were not elected in a cultural vacuum.2 '
Years of anti-Semitic propaganda and indoctrination preceded their po-
litical successes. 22
The instrumentality of destructive messages in mobilizing a coterie
devoted to abusing outgroups raises the question of whether their intimi-
dating communications should be restricted. In assessing the need for a
hate speech statute, the freedom to intimidate must be balanced against the
reasonable expectation of civic order. Speakers should not have an unlimited
license to promote discrimination that infringes on the targeted groups'
freedom to choose a profession,2 3 to choose a spouse, 24 or to raise children.2 5
Supreme Court precedents indicate the constitutionality of balancing
speech against other fundamental rights. In Schenck v. Pro Choice Net-
work of Western New York, the Court balanced the right of abortion pro-
testors against the government's interest in public safety, upholding an
dormant within the most benign patriotic rhetoric and the glamour of national sameness it
promotes."); G. Legman, Psychopathology of Comics, in BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 146-
47 (Frantz Fanon ed., 4th ed. 1986) (stating that the national conscience can be lulled by
popular national prejudices).
19 See Hanno Scheuch, Austria 1918-55: From the First To the Second Republic, 32 HIST.
J. 177, 184 (1989) (noting the decline of the German Nazi party after the Beer Hall Putsch);
Peter D. Stachura, National Socialism and the German Proletariat, 1925-1935: Old Myths
and New Perspectives, 36 HIST. J. 701, 705 (1993) (discussing how little support from
workers the Nazis had at the time of the Beer Hall Putsch).
2
°WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 118, 185, 187
(1960); see also David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445,
464 (1987).
21 See Dietrich Orlow, The Conversion of Myths Into Political Power: The Case of the
Nazi Party, 72 AM. HIST. REV. 906 (1967) (discussing the centrality of anti-Semitic myths
in the Nazi rise to power).
22 See LucY S. DAWIDOWICz, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945, at 34-35 (1975)
(discussing the nineteenth-century manifestations of political anti-Semitism); JOHN WEISS,
IDEOLOGY OF DEATH 84 (1996) (discussing how Otto Glagau developed an anti-Semitic
slogan in 1876 that continued to be popular into the Nazi era).
23 See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1999) ("[T]his Court has indicated that
the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes some
generalized due process right to choose one's field of private employment ... which is
nevertheless subject to reasonable government regulation.").
24 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (determining that marriage is a
fundamental civil right); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that "[t]he Four-
teenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidi-
ous racial discriminations").
25 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up
children").
[Vol. 41
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injunction against the protestors that burdened no more speech than was
necessary to achieve security. 26 The Court has also balanced the rights of
speakers against the right of the audience to be left alone. In Frisby v.
Schultz, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting picketing in a residential
area because the targeted doctor had become figuratively, "and perhaps
literally, trapped within the home, and ... [w]as left with no ready means
of avoiding the unwanted speech.""1 In a different context, as W. Bradley
Wendel has pointed out, the Illinois Bar Committee balanced the First
Amendment rights of Matthew Hale, the leader of the supremacist World
Church of the Creator, against the interests in racial equality and human
dignity, and chose to deny Hale a license to practice law in Illinois.2" Other
countries have also recognized that the constitutional right to be free from
intimidation tips the scales against the desires of speakers who aim to use
words or signs that rally bigots to commit harmful actions. 29 Government
has a significant interest in protecting the safety of groups against the
cathartic interest of intimidating bigots.
II. ADDRESSING THE ABSOLUTIST PERSPECTIVE
Some free speech absolutists, such as Harvey Silverglate,30 have argued
that regulating the spread of destructive messages amounts to an uncon-
stitutional intrusion into speakers' rights. The most prominent judicial
advocate of the absolutist position was Justice Black.3" He maintained that
laws directly limiting speech were unjustifiable "by a congressional or judi-
cial balancing process."32 Any limitation on First Amendment freedoms, he
26 See 519 U.S. 357, 374-76 (1997); see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512
U.S. 753, 770 (1994).
27487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
28 W. Bradley Wendel, "Certain Fundamental Truths": A Dialectic on Negative and
Positive Liberty in Hate-Speech Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 35 (2002).
29 See Bradley A. Appleman, Hate Speech: A Comparison of the Approaches Taken by the
United States and Germany, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 422, 434 (1996) (giving examples of how the
German Constitutional Court has a low tolerance for hate speech when balancing it against
equal dignity interests); Kathleen Mahoney, Recognizing the Constitutional Significance of
Harmful Speech: The Canadian View of Pornography and Hate Propaganda, in THE PRICE
WE PAY 279 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995) (discussing the Canadian
approach of balancing freedom of expression against Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantee of equality); Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First
Amendment Jurisprudence: An Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 774 (2000) (discussing Canadian balancing of hate propaganda
and free speech).
30 See Ben Lehrer, Silverglate '67 Calls for Repeal of Sexual Harassment Guidelines,
HARV. L. REC., Mar. 5, 1999, at 7, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/
forurnsilver6.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2004) (concerning Silverglate's self-characterization
as a free speech absolutist).
" See, e.g., Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.YU. L. REv. 865, 867 (1960); Edmond
Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes ": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 549 (1962).
32 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
2004]
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went on, not only "violate[s] the genius of our written Constitution, but it
runs expressly counter to the injunction to Court and Congress made by
Madison when he introduced the Bill of Rights."33 Black's absolutism had
textualist origins: "I do not subscribe to [the balancing] doctrine for I be-
lieve that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall
be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be
done in this field."34 The majority of the Court never shared Black's convic-
tion on this point.3 5
In fact, in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, the Court explicitly stated
that the "Court has frequently denied that First Amendment rights are abso-
lute. '3 6 While free speech is essential to a robust exchange of ideas in our
pluralistic, constitutional republic,37 the Supreme Court has announced that
some narrowly tailored exceptions do not violate the First Amendment,
as long as they serve a compelling state interest. Contemporary jurispru-
dence recognizes the constitutionality of laws limiting a variety of speech,
including: (1) a zoning limitation aimed at the secondary effects of oper-
ating adult theaters,38 (2) a statutory prohibition against threatening the
President,39 (3) a restriction forbidding electioneering within 100 feet of a
polling place on election day, 0 (4) a provision prohibiting the deceptive
and misleading use of a trade name," (5) a statute punishing the knowing
destruction or mutilation of draft cards, 2 and (6) a prohibition of the dis-
31 Id. at 143 (Black, J., dissenting).
34 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
35 See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U.
L. REV. 281, 283 (1995).
36427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
37 See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1409-
10 (1986) ("The purpose of free speech is not individual self-actualization, but rather the
preservation of democracy, and the right of a people, as a people, to decide what kind of
life it wishes to live. Autonomy is protected not because of its intrinsic value ... but rather
as a means or instrument of collective self-determination").
38 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986). In Renton, the
Court held that the adult theater zoning ordinance at issue was content-neutral and subject
only to intermediate scrutiny because the law targeted the secondary effects of adult enter-
tainment establishments. Id. at 47-48, 54. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Kennedy, how-
ever, used subsequent concurring opinions to criticize Renton's "content-neutral" charac-
terization. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part).
39 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (noting, in dicta, that
a statute prohibiting a knowing and willful threat against the President was constitutional
on its face, but reversing a conviction under it because the alleged threat was a mere "po-
litical hyperbole").
40 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206, 211 (1992) (finding a Tennessee statute sur-
vived strict scrutiny, in part, based on a "widespread and time tested consensus" and "sim-
ple common sense").
4' Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (finding that the use of a trade name is a
commercial form of speech that the state can regulate).
42 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (reasoning that the govern-
ment interest in regulating the "non-speech" elements of the conduct warrants the "inci-
[Vol. 41
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tribution of obscene materials appealing to prurient interests in sex and
portraying "sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as
a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."43
Like obscenity and threats made against the President, hate speech
has a very low social and political value.44 Indeed, like fighting words, which
the First Amendment does not protect, destructive messages should be
deemed "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."45
In addition to being at odds with constitutional jurisprudence, abso-
lutists believe that restricting hate speech is as risky to a well-functioning
polity, especially to its most disempowered members, as restricting po-
litical speech.46 This perspective overlooks how vitriol that is actively bent
on infringing some citizens' civil rights undermines the free exchange of
political, philosophical, literary, and scientific views.47 In fact, hate speech
uses the fagade of free speech to intimidate speakers from freely ex-
changing ideas on topics of public interest.
The phrase, "Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech,"
is not a blanket prohibition against all regulation of communicative acts. Its
underlying idea is far more complicated. A court evaluating whether a
speech regulation violates the First Amendment must deliberate on whether
the regulation restricts more speech than is necessary to prevent foresee-
able harms and whether it chills protected speech.48 First Amendment
issues are decided by considering the competing public and private con-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms").
41 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
44 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Limits of Hate Speech: Does Race Matter?, 32
GONz. L. REV. 491, 502 (1996) ("Hate speech raises the issue of a conflict between politi-
cal participation by minorities and speech or action which threatens that participation. Like
shouting 'fire' in a crowded theater, like child pornography and obscenity, hate speech is of
little value to society, yet the consequences for its targets and for society are certainly of
'constitutional significance."').
41 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding the prevention of
and punishment for "fighting words" to be constitutional).
46 For instance, Nadine Strossen, the president of the American Civil Liberties Union,
has argued that hate speech restrictions are disproportionately enforced against groups
lacking political power. Nadine Strossen, Incitement to Hatred: Should There Really Be a
Limit?, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243, 266 (2001).
47 Along these lines, Steven J. Heyman has pointed out that hate speech does not con-
tribute to democratic self-government because it undermines mutual respect among citi-
zens. Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1119, 1185 n.413.
41 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (holding that
"the greater 'objectivity' of commercial speech justifies affording the State more freedom
to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones ... and that the greater
'hardiness' of commercial speech ... likely diminishes the chilling effect that may attend
its regulation" (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771, n.24 (1976))); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(holding that as long as liability for defamation is based on intentional or reckless false-
hood, it does not impermissibly chill protected speech).
2004]
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cerns involved in a particular case.49 Justice Frankfurter explained that "[ft]he
demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in
national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the
competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by
announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be
solved."5 0
Numerous countries recognize the incongruity of inciteful hate speech
with their governments' obligation to protect fundamental interests.51 For
instance, the German Basic Law, upon which that country's constitutional
system is based, reflects the disjunction between political speech and ex-
pressions aimed at undermining democracy. Article 21, section 2, out-
laws political parties that threaten democratic order.5 2 Similarly, Canada
prohibits hate speech because it subverts the democratic process.53
International conventions also recognize the incongruity. The European
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms provides that speech can be limited to preserve democratic order.54
Likewise, Article 4(5) of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination commits signatories to outlawing
incitement to engage in racial discrimination.5 5
The United States Supreme Court has similarly recognized that leg-
islatures can restrict inciteful discourse based on defamation and group
stereotypes. In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of a group libel statute that made it unlawful to portray "depravity,
criminality ... or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed, or religion" and to expose those citizens to "contempt, derision, or
obloquy."56 The majority found that based on Illinois's history of racial
conflict, the legislature had the power to punish group libel when it
threatened "the peace and well-being of the State."57
49 See Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 126.
50 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
51 Many democracies, including Austria, Finland, and Italy, prohibit inciteful hate
speech. See § 283 StGB (Aus.); Penal Code ch. 11, § 8 (Fin.); Decree-Law 122 (Apr. 26,
1993), Law 205 (June 25, 2003) (Italy). For a fuller discussion, see TsEsIS, supra note 13,
at ch. 12.
52 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 21.2, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: GERMANY 115 (A. P. Blaustein & G. H. Flanz eds., official
trans., 1994).
53 See Regina v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 764 (Can.) (finding that hate propa-
ganda argues "for a society in which the democratic process is subverted and individuals
are denied respect and dignity simply because of racial or religious characteristics"). The
Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed its commitment to this case in Regina v. Keegstra [1996]
1 S.C.R. 458 (Can.).54 Art. 10, 312 U.N.T.S. 22, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Proto-
col No. 5, E.T.S. 55, & Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118.
15 UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION art. 4(5), available at http://wwww.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/9.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2004).
56 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952).
51 Id. at 258-59. Erwin Chemerinsky and Nadine Strossen have argued that Beauhar-
[Vol. 41
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III. POLITICAL EXPLOITATION OF INTIMIDATION
Even political speech can exploit stigmatizing stereotypes to advo-
cate restricting the civil liberties of disempowered minorities. An exam-
ple of this phenomenon is the reliance of Tsar Nicholas II's secret police
on anti-Semitism in fabricating the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in or-
der to discredit revolutionary groups. 8 From Imperial Russia through Nazi
Germany, the Protocols spurred on devoted anti-Semites. 9 Egypt's and
Syria's current governments continue to use the forgery as proof of a Jewish
conspiracy to dominate world politics. 6 The example of the Protocols dem-
onstrates how an individual libel of an ethnic group can be used to fur-
ther political ambitions and incite hate for nearly a century.
In the United States, parts of the Constitution as originally drafted
reflected the effectiveness of vociferous pro-slavery demands of Georgia's
and South Carolina's representatives to the Constitutional Convention.6"
Until states ratified the Reconstruction Amendments, the First Amend-
ment coexisted harmoniously alongside constitutional provisions that
specially protected the institution of slavery. These included the Three-
Fifths Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause, and the Importation Clause.62
The First Amendment was, by itself, inadequate to rid the United States
nais probably did not survive New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which
announced an actual malice requirement for defamations against public figures. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 978 (2d ed. 2002); Nad-
ine Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have To Choose Between Freedom of
Speech and Equality, 46 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 449, 459 n.41 (1996). This skepticism is
unfounded because New York Times quotes Beauharnais, indicating its continuing prece-
dential value. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 268. Moreover, even R.A.V v. St. Paul, which
was otherwise critical of a hate speech ordinance, quoted Beauharnais for the proposition that
some categories of speech are "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech."
505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). New York Times's effect on Beauharnais extends only to cases
where group libels are directed at public personalities. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
763 (1982).
58STEPHEN E. BRONNER, A RUMOR ABOUT THE JEWS: REFLECTIONS ON ANTISEMI-
TISM AND THE PROTOCOLS OF THE LEARNED ELDERS OF ZION 1, 4, 114 (2000) (concerning
the sources of the forgery and its use of traditional myth and modern prejudices).
59 BENJAMIN W. SEGEL, A LIE AND A LIBEL 22-23, 87-93 (Richard S. Levy ed. &
trans., Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1995) (1926) (early warning about the dangers the
pamphlet posed to Jews); Bronner, supra note 58, at 4, 114.
60 Judea Pearl, This Tide of Madness, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at A12 (discussing
the recent Egyptian state media's production of a television special based on the Protocols,
asserting the "fantasy that Jews are plotting to take over the world"); State Department Press
Releases and Documents, U.S. Will Press OSCE to Adopt New Measures to Fight Anti-
Semitism-U.S. Envoy to Israel Previews OSCE Conference in Berlin in April, 2004 WL
59149725 (stating that in 2003 Syria financed a twenty-nine-part Hizbollah broadcast "which
was full of anti-Semitic and demonizing representations of Jews based on the 'Protocols of
the Elders of Zion"').
61 For a thorough discussion of South Carolina's and Georgia's demands, see CALVIN
C. JILLSON, CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, at 140-50 (1988).
62 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, partly repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2;
id. art. IV, § 2 cl. 3, affected by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; id. art. I, § 9, cl. I.
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of slavery. Rather, in the antebellum period, the proponents of slavery
often dominated the political discourse.
During that period, Southern politicians used the congressional forum
to exact numerous legal compromises aimed at preserving and spreading
slavery. The passionate Southern advocacy of race-based slavery led to the
Missouri Compromise of 1820 and later the Compromise of 1850, which
contained the Fugitive Slave Act. William S. Jenkins, one of the leading
historians of pro-slavery thought, has noted how important the Missouri
debates were in increasing support for slavery and subduing opposition to
the institution.63 These debates were not only legalistic but also accentu-
ated philosophical and moralistic differences about human bondage. 64 At
the end of the Missouri debates, the proponents of slavery were able to
extend slavery into Missouri. Proslavery Southerners wanting to prevent
slaves from escaping to the North later overcame passionate antislavery
opposition and enacted the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which required
ordinary citizens in the North to participate in the recapture of fugitive
slaves. 65 Legislative successes of slavery's advocates indicate that they
were more successful in the antebellum marketplace of ideas than those
who opposed slavery.66
63 WILLIAM S. JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 66 (1935).
64 During one congressional debate on admitting Missouri into the Union, Rufus King
argued that natural law forbade one man to enslave another. Quoted in id. at 67-68 n.54.
At another point of the Missouri controversy, Senator Jonathan Roberts of Pennsylvania
overtly rejected the claim that slavery was a "right ... I deny that there is any power in a
State to make slaves, or to introduce slavery where it has been abolished, or where it never
existed .... " 16 ANNALS CONG. 338 (1820). In light of Congress's decision to admit Mis-
souri as a slave state, however, King's and Robert's views seem to have lost out to the dia-
tribe of proslavery congressmen, such as the influential Senator William Smith of South
Carolina. Smith disputed the view of those who lavished "opprobrious epithets ... upon
those who hold slaves; calling the practice cruel, derogatory to the character of the nation,
opposed to Christian religion, the law of God, pagain in its principle ... ." Id. at 264.
Smith claimed that slaves were, in fact, well off because "no class of laboring people in
any country upon the globe ... are better clothed, better fed, or are more cheerful, or labor
less, or who are more happy, or, indeed, who have more liberty and indulgence than the
slaves of the Southern and Western States." Id. at 268. Smith considerably swayed some
senators who understood him to be justifying the moral right of slavery and set the stage
for later proponents of slavery. Philip F. Detweiler, Congressional Debate on Slavery and
the Declaration of Independence, 1819-1821, 63 AM. HIST. REV. 598, 605 (explaining that
Senator Smith's justification of slavery contributed to "a larger pattern of Southern re-
sponses to the increasing antislavery sentiment"); JENKINS, supra note 63, at 71 (quoting
senators who, during the debate on the Missouri Compromise, lauded Smith's justification
of slavery).
65 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, repealed by Act of June 28,
1864, ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200.
66 Anti-slavery activists amongst the Founders included John Jay, who presided over
the New York Society for Promoting the Manumission of Slaves, and Benjamin Franklin,
who was elected president of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of
Slavery. OSCAR REISS, BLACKS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 166 (1997). Leading figures in the
revolutionary movement who propounded the anti-slavery position included James Otis,
Thomas Paine, and John Adams. Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Con-
tract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1306 n.150 (2000); R. B. Bernstein,
Rediscovering Thomas Paine, 39 N.YL. SCH. L. REV. 873, 881 (1994); John R. Howe, Jr.,
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Some politicians became folk heroes because of their proslavery apolo-
getics. For instance, Senator John Calhoun influenced generations of South-
ern thought. Calhoun popularized slavery and affected followers who were
willing to secede from the Union in order to preserve the South's peculiar
institution.67
Clearly, not all racist deprecations are benign. When coupled with po-
litical power, racist deprecations can become part of a country's basic laws,
cause harm for several generations, and disempower millions of people.
Slavery did not end because of abolitionist discourse-although the voices
of Theodore Weld, William Lloyd Garrison, and Frederick Douglass raised
awareness about the hardships of slavery-but through a bloody Civil
War.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY To REGULATE HATE SPEECH
Following the War, the Radical Republicans designed the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, most conspicuously the enforcement clauses in section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to empower Congress to protect civil rights, particularly of formerly
disempowered blacks. Akhil Reed Amar has pointed out that the Recon-
struction Amendments shifted the constitutional paradigm, including the
significance of the First Amendment.68 Reconstruction, which for all practi-
cal purposes was woefully unsuccessful, constitutionally committed the
country to the very pursuit of equality that hate speakers want to undermine.
The First Amendment does not exist in a historical void; evaluations of
what speech it protects must be balanced against the anti-oppression princi-
ples embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.69 After the
John Adams's Views on Slavery, 49 J. NEGRO HIST. 201, 201-02 (1964).
67 David A. J. Richards, Comparative Revolutionary Constitutionalism: A Research
Agenda for Comparative Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 16 (1993) (asserting that
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), embodied Calhoun's constitutionalism). Cal-
houn argued that the relationship between blacks and whites in the South formed "the most
solid and durable foundation on which to rear free and stable political institutions." Speech
on the reception of Abolition Petitions (Feb. 6, 1837), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CAL-
HOUN 625, 632 (Richard K. Crall6 ed., New York: D. Appleton 1883). He combined the
fictitious view of biologically distinct races, having varying physical and intellectual abili-
ties, with the self-serving conclusion that it was better for whites and blacks that the latter
be enslaved in the United States than free in Africa. See Report on that portion of the
President's Message which related to the adoption of efficient measures to prevent the
circulation of incendiary Abolition Petitions through the Mail (Feb. 4, 1836), in 5 THE
WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 190, 204 (Richard K. Crall6 ed., New York: D. Appleton
1883). Along the same lines, South Carolina Governor James H. Hammond unapologeti-
cally argued before the U.S. Senate that white civilization was justified in benefiting from
an unrecompensed black workforce. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix at 71
(Mar. 4, 1858), quoted in JENKINS, supra note 63, at 286.
68 See Amar, supra note 5, at 155-60 (arguing that the second section of the Thirteenth
Amendment provides a better constitutional argument for the regulation of hate speech
than the First Amendment would on its own).
691 draw my analysis on the Thirteenth Amendment from the works of scholars who
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passage of these two amendments, the expression of harmful intentions
substantially likely to cause advocated misethnic subordination is no longer
protected speech, as it was in the antebellum South.7"
Of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment is
particularly relevant to the regulation of hate symbols and other destructive
messages. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress may rationally de-
termine and legitimately pass necessary and proper legislation to eradi-
cate any remaining badges and incidents of servitude.7' In the landmark
case Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, the Supreme Court extended the Thirteenth
Amendment's reach well beyond forced labor. Jones ruled that with the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 Congress prohibiting private and public discrimi-
nation in the sale of real estate, and that doing so was "necessary and
proper" to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.7 2 In the cases that followed
Jones, the Court continued to interpret broadly Congress's section 2
authority to prohibit stigmatizing conduct.73 Runyon v. McCrary is repre-
sentative of the trend-in that case, the Court determined that § 1981,
passed pursuant to Congress's Thirteenth Amendment enforcement author-
ity, prevented a private school from refusing to enroll black children.74
have argued for balancing First Amendment principles with Fourteenth Amendment val-
ues. See, e.g., John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality,
85 Ky. L.J. 9, 89-90 (1997) (discussing how to balance First Amendment speech values
with Fourteenth Amendment equality values); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 481 ("We must weigh
carefully and critically the competing constitutional values expressed in the first and four-
teenth amendments.").
70 Andrew Taslitz has made a similar point in a different context, in regard to the ap-
plicability of the Reconstruction Amendments to the regulation of bias crimes: "The Four-
teenth Amendment is best understood as denying constitutional protection to the expres-
sive component of racial violence. First Amendment free 'speech' in a post-Reconstruction
world cannot sensibly be understood as including the expression embodied in group-
directed violence." Taslitz, supra note 66, at 1287.
1' Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) ("Congress has the power
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the inci-
dents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.").
72 Id. at 439 (the Enabling Clause "clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws nec-
essary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States"'
(quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))). The Court read section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000), to prohibit private actors from discriminat-
ing against real property purchasers: "[T]he fact that § 1982 operates upon the unofficial
acts of private individuals, whether or not sanctioned by state law, presents no constitutional
problem. If Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions
that prevent Negroes from buying and renting property because of their race or color, then
no federal statute calculated to achieve that objective can be thought to exceed the consti-
tutional power of Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the
conduct of private individuals." Jones, 392 U.S. at 438-39.
11 See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (holding
that racial membership requirements for neighborhood swimming pools are prohibited);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (filing with the EEOC did not
toll the limitation to file suit under § 1981).
74427 U.S. 160, 172-73, 179 (1976).
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Both Jones and Runyon give Congress broad discretion to define the
incidents of involuntary servitude. Substantive statutes passed under sec-
tion 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment that protect the enjoyment of freedom
can extend well beyond section l's self-executing protections.75 Congress
can investigate and determine whether involuntary servitude is linked to
modem forms of discrimination. In Jones, the Court determined that housing
discrimination, which is not literally slavery, falls within congressional sec-
tion 2 authority. The Court was not saying that Alfred H. Mayer Com-
pany's refusal to sell property to the Joneses was slavery. Nor did the Run-
yons enslave Michael McCrary when they refused to enroll him. Likewise,
even though hate speech is not literally slavery, it should be prohibited
under the broad protections against racial subordination to which the
Thirteenth Amendment applies.
The Supreme Court has established that the Thirteenth Amendment
extends to "varieties of private conduct ... beyond the actual imposition
of slavery or involuntary servitude. 7 6 The Amendment stands for the
proposition that "former slaves and their descendants should be forever
free."77 Furthermore, freedom is guaranteed wherever the United States
has jurisdiction, regardless of whether oppressions are committed against
the direct descendants of slavery. Senator Lyman Trumbull, whose Judi-
ciary Committee reported the language of the Thirteenth Amendment,
explained Congress's enforcement authority: "If in order to prevent slav-
ery Congress deem it necessary to declare null and void all laws which
will not permit the colored man to contract, which will not permit him to
testify, which will not permit him to buy and sell, and to go where he
pleases, it has the power to do so, and not only the power, but it becomes
its duty to do so."" Nor is the Thirteenth Amendment applicable only to
discrimination against blacks. On another date, Trumbull explained that the
Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the authority to "pass any law
which, in our judgment, is deemed appropriate, and which will accom-
plish the end in view, secure freedom to all people in the United States."79
" See Akhil R. Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 822-23 (1999) (de-
scribing Congress's broad section 2 power to pass far-reaching, substantive statutes).
7 6 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971).
77 Id.
71 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866).
79 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). The Court maintained this position
in the Slaughter-House Cases, in which it found that the Amendment applies to "Mexican
peonage and the Chinese coolie labor system." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). Contem-
porary decisions dealing with the Thirteenth Amendment have also understood "race" to
include a variety of ethnic groups. In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, the Court held
that § 1982 applies to any group that Congress intended to protect when it enacted that
statute in 1866, pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment section 2 authority. 481 U.S. 615, 617
(1987). The Court held specifically that Jews and Arabs are part of the protected class that
can bring a cause of action pursuant to § 1982. Id. at 617-18. In another case, the Court
determined "Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of per-
sons who were subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or
ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended
2004]
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Congress's role is to determine what the rubrics of freedom are and to
safeguard their availability through necessary and proper legislation.
The Thirteenth Amendment therefore does far more than simply pro-
hibit institutionalized slavery; it prevents any form of private or government-
sponsored racial subordination. And courts should defer to Congress's
findings on this point as long as there is any rational basis for those findings.
Thus, if Congress finds that hate speech is rationally related to the badges or
incidents of servitude, it may use its section 2 power to prohibit it.
For instance, Congress can investigate whether persons who seek to
intimidate others with images that are historically linked to oppression
are likely to achieve their purpose. Those images may include burning
crosses and swastikas. If Congress finds that the risk of intimidation is
high, it can legitimately invoke its section 2 authority to prohibit the in-
tentionally intimidating display of those images. A symbol's meaning de-
pends on the context in which it is used. Symbols can connect even dispa-
rate elements of people's experiences, filling them with cultural content.8"
The implication is that images such as burning crosses and swastikas can
relay related static, supremacist, and violent messages.81 It is reasonable
to believe that Congress can determine the symbols that are used to ter-
rorize populations perpetuate the badges and incidents of servitude.
Congress's Thirteenth Amendment authority to regulate the private
use of destructive symbols is a better source of power than the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress broader authority
than the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court long ago limited to the
regulation of government conduct.8 2
Further, Congress's power under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment might be better suited to enacting a national hate speech law than
the Commerce Clause. While Congress's Commerce Clause authority ex-
§ 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern sci-
entific thoery." St. Francis Coll. V. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611 (1987).
80 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
958 (1995) (explaining how social meaning is based on contextual associations of fact).
81 See Matsuda, supra note 10, at 2365-66; Robin D. Barnes, Standing Guard for the
PC. Militia, or Righting Hatred and Indifference: Some Thoughts on Expressive Hate-
Conduct & Political Correctness, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 979, 979 n.1 (discussing the resur-
gence of supremacist groups using Confederate symbols and swastikas "as a reminder of
their pledge to uphold racial violence, murder, and mutilation").
82 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882). Recently, the Court re-
lied on the state action requirement in striking down the Violence Against Women Act of
1994. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620-21 (2000). Although this is not the
right place for an extensive discussion of the differences between Thirteenth Amendment
section 2 and Fourteenth Amendment section 5 powers, suffice it to say that the Court's
limitation of section 5 power seems artificially narrow in light of the changes the Recon-
struction Amendments were meant to effectuate. See Amar, supra note 75, at 822-24 (ar-
guing that section 2 and section 5 give Congress a similar breadth of interpretive power);
but see Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 431, 493-
94 (2002) (arguing that the section 2 and section 5 enforcement powers differ significantly
because of the latter's state action requirement).
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tends to many forms of private discrimination, 3 recently, in United States
v. Morrison and United States v. Lopez, the Court reduced Congress's inter-
pretive power under that clause.8 4 The Court now requires that conduct
regulated under the Commerce Clause have a "substantial effect" on in-
terstate commerce,8" which has altered the previous inquiry into whether
Congress has a rational basis for believing the statute would have a signifi-
cant effect on commerce.8 6 In the name of federalism, the Court has both
diminished Congress's power to act on rational findings that regulated action
affects interstate commerce and has increased judicial oversight author-
ity. Morrison and Lopez have made the Thirteenth Amendment ever more
relevant because, since Jones, the Court has not deviated from the ra-
tional basis scrutiny of laws passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.
Another reason why the Thirteenth Amendment might be preferable is
that, unlike the Commerce Clause, the Amendment would allow the federal
legislature to prohibit hate speech with either an intrastate or an interstate
effect.87
A federal anti-intimidation law is preferable to state-by-state legis-
lation. The enactment of a federal law will demonstrate a national com-
mitment to preventing the terrorizing use of subordinating images. A fed-
eral, uniform law would provide a remedy for victims in states that lack
any law against intimidating hate speech.
Such a federal law against racist incitement may be modeled after
the Virginia Cross Burning Statute, which the Court, in Virginia v. Black,
found partially constitutional in 2003. The statute provided,
81 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
14 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggre-
gate effect on interstate commerce."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)
(holding Congress may regulate three areas of commerce: channels, instrumentalities, and
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce).
85 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
86 In a dissent to Lopez, Justice Breyer argued that Commerce Clause cases have not
consistently used the "substantial effects" label: "I use the word 'significant' because the
word 'substantial' implies a somewhat nairrower power than recent precedent suggests. But
to speak of 'substantial effect' rather than 'significant effect' would make no difference in
this case." Id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
87 The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition obviously not only prohibits slavery with some
substantial effect on the interstate economy, but applies to any form of involuntary servi-
tude, even when its perpetration is completely centered in one state. The Anti-Peonage Act
is an important prohibition against intrastate and interstate acts of involuntary servitude. 14
Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000)). The Act was enacted
pursuant to section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4,
17 (1944). The intrastate uses of the Anti-Peonage Act has long been established. See
Bailey v. State, 219 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
Circuit court holdings on the perpetration of peonage continue to hold on to the intrastate
reach of the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095, 1097-98
(4th Cir. 1983) (concerning involuntary servitude occurring on a migrant farm in Wilson,
N.C.).
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[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent
of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause
to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or
other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of
this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of
a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a
person or group of persons."
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found Virginia's prohibition
against intentionally intimidating cross burning to be a legitimate limitation
on speech that was of "such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."89 Thus, the Virginia statute constitution-
ally limited a form of expression that posed an imminent threat of harm.90
The Court also determined that the statute did not discriminate on the ba-
sis of the communicators' viewpoint because it prohibited any form of
cross burning, regardless of whether it targeted the victims' race, religion,
or other characteristics. 9' Virginia could selectively punish cross burnings,
even though it did not criminalize all other forms of virulent intimidation,
"in light of the cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of
impending violence. '92 A plurality of the Court, however, found that the
statute's prima facie evidence presumption was unconstitutional because
it failed to contextualize "factors that are necessary to decide whether a par-
ticular cross burning is intended to intimidate" or only to arouse anger.93
11 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1541-42 (2003) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
423 (1996)).
89 Black, 538 U.S. at 358-59 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
90 The Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment does not protect the "in-
citement of imminent lawless action." Id. at 359 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 449 (1969)).
9, Id. at 362-63.
92 Id. at 363. This conclusion was an apparent departure from the Court's holding in
R.A.V v. St. Paul, wherein the Court found that an ordinance banning fighting words sin-
gling out race, gender, color, creed, or religion, instead of altogether banning fighting
words, was improper content-based discrimination. 505 U.S. at 391. In Black, however, the
Court explicitly found its holding to be consistent with Black, 538 U.S. at 361-63.
93 Id. at 3622. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Breyer made
up the plurality, opining that the prima facie element of the offense was unconstitutional.
Justice Scalia, who had joined the Court in other parts of the opinion, thought that the
prima facie element may have been a legitimate form of rebuttable presumption that the
Virginia Court should have been required to construe on remand. Id. at 368-80 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenitng in part). Scalia was
joined on this point by Justice Thomas, who wrote a separate dissent. Id. at 388-400
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part with Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, never reached the prima facie issue, writing
instead against the constitutionality of the entire statute: "In my view, severance of the prima
facie evidence provision now could not eliminate the unconstitutionality of the whole statute at
the time of the respondents' conduct." Id. at 387 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 41
HeinOnline  -- 41 Harv. J. on Legis. 404 2004
Regulating Intimidating Speech
Congress should follow the Court's guidance in Black, and, pursuant
to its Thirteenth Amendment section 2 power, draft a comparable federal
law that prohibits the intimidating use of historically inflammatory sym-
bols. Because cross burning is not the only symbol with an established his-
tory that signals impending violence and ethnic subordination, the statute
should also cover anything from swastikas (even though they harken back
to enslavement in other countries) to some displays of Confederate sym-
bols. 94 All of these symbols can intimidate persons regardless of their
race, ethnicity, or religion. To avoid the charge of viewpoint discrimina-
tion, the legislators might refrain from listing these symbols in particular,
and instead adopt an inclusive, general provision. The law would then not
simply prohibit the use of some listed intimidating symbols; instead, it
would prohibit the intimidating use of any symbol whose history is linked to
slavery or involuntary servitude. The burden of proving that a particular
symbol is intimidating should fall on the government, which may be able
to strengthen its case by using the expert testimony of historians.
Such a law should meet all the rigors of any other criminal legislation
(that is, it should require proof beyond a reasonable doubt both in the
hearing and sentencing phases, the right to a speedy trial, etc.) and grant
federal district courts jurisdiction to hear cases. The law should require
prosecutors to prove intent as an element of the crime, which would avoid
Virginia's error of making intent a prima facie presumption. The intent
element could be satisfied by proof of purpose, recklessness, or knowledge.
I recognize that my proposal would probably somewhat increase the
federal docket. However, such a sacrifice is part of the post-Reconstruction
cost of maintaining a free society devoted to the protection of civil rights
and civil liberties.
94 See Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amend-
ment Approach, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 539, 595-610 (2003); L. Darnell Weeden, How to
Establish Flying the Confederate Flag with the State as Sponsor Violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 334 AKRON L. REv. 521, 542 (2001) (asserting that the "Confederate flag
was lost forever as a race-neutral symbol when the forces of racism used it for so many
years to continue the violence and intimidation what could not be won on the Civil War
battlefield").
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